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FAMILY PARTNERSHIPS UNDER THE INCOME TAX

Yale A. Barkan*

I
INTRODUCTION

HE usual type of family partnership1 has the taxpayer operating
or organizing a business, and giving or selling a portion of that
business to his wife or children. The aim of the taxpayer is to divide
his income among members of the family group.2 The profits are thus
taxed to two or more individuals, rather than to the taxpayer alone.
Recognition of these family partnerships for federal income tax purposes is just one aspect of the family income problem.
Since the enactment of the income tax statute in 1913,8 taxpayers
have used many techniques in attempting to minimize taxes on income
and still retain the benefits of its control/'
Assignments of income from personal services,5 from the beneficial

T

* B.S., LL.B.,

Harvard. Member of Ohio Bar.
The term family partnership will be used to denote a husband and wife partnership as well as a partnership of which children or other relatives of the taxpayer
are members.
2
Randolph Pa,ul, "The Background of the Revenue Act of 1937," 5 UNIV, CHI.
L. REV. 41 at 48 (1937). "One characteristic underlies several of these devices; the
multiplication of the taxpayer's personality. A taxpayer . • • starts wi~ single individuality and subdivides himself by various mechanisms into a group of people."
8
Revenue Act of 1913, 38 Stat. L. 166.
'Mr. Justice Cardozo in Burnet v. Wells, 289 U.S. 670 at 676, 53 S.Ct. 761
( 193 3). "One can read in the revisions of the Revenue Acts the record of the government's endeavor to keep pace with the fertility of invention whereby the taxpayers
had contrived to keep the larger benefits of ownership and be relieved of the attendant
burdens/'
5
Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. 111, 50 S. Ct. 241 (1930). Here the assignor had
services· still to perform before the compensation was earned, and the Court held the
assignor taxable on the portion assig?J.ed to the wife.
Cf. Helvering v. Eubank, 311 U.S. 122, 61 S.Ct. 149 (1940) where the taxpayer attempted assignment of renewal insurance commissions, and no further services
were required of the assignor; held, taxable to the assignor.
Contra: Hall v. Burnet, (C.C.A. D.C. 1931) 54 F. (2d) 443, certiorari denied,
285 U.S. 552, 52 S.Ct. 407 (1932).
1
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interest in a trust,6 and from property,1 have all been in.effective in
shifting the tax burden. 8 Setting up trusts for members of the family 9
has also been a favorite method of dividing income, thus avoiding
some of the effects of graduated rates.1 ° From the use of all these
· devices the only concrete result has been a large volume of litigation
and defeat after defeat for the taxpayer.11
"Through the devices thus neutralized, as well as through
many others, there runs a common thread of purpose. The soli6 Harrison v. Schaffner, 312 U.S. 579, 61 S.Ct. 759 (1941). The beneficiary
of a trust assigned his interest to his wife for a term of one year. The income was
taxed to the assignor.
But cf. Blair v. Commissioner, 300 U.S._5, 57 S.Ct. 330 (1937). The beneficiary of a trust assigned irrevocably a· portion of his interest. The assignment was for
the duration of the trust. The Court held that the assignee became in effect a beneficiary of the trust and was taxable on its income. ·
7
Helvering v. Horst, 3II U.S. 112, 61 S.Ct. 144 (1940). Gift before maturity
of interest coupons from bonds. Held, taxable to donor.
Cf. Griffiths v. Helvering, 308 U.S. 355, 60 S.Ct. 277 (1939). The taxpayer
attempted to consummate a sale of shares through the medium of a wholly owned corporation. The corporate entity was disregarded. and the income taxed to the assignor.
8
Community property has been a conspicious exception to the general rule stated
in the text. The validity of the community property device in splitting income for
tax purposes between husband and wife was upheld for the eight traditional community property states in Poe v. Seaborn, 282 U.S. 101, 51 S.Ct. 58 (1930).
Recent attempts to extend the benefits of this decision to Oklahoma families were
scotched by the Supreme Court in Commissioner v. Harmon, 323 U.S. 44, 65 S.Ct.
103 (1944).
9
The income from a trust revocable by the settlor was taxed to the settlor under
the Revenue Act of 1924, 43 Stat. L. 253 at 277, in Corliss v. Bowers, 281 U.S.
376, 50 S.Ct. 336 (1930); the same result was reached under the same statute when
the trust was revocable by the settlor and a person not having a "substantial adverse
interest" in Reineke v. Smith, 289 U.S. 172, S.Ct. 570 (1933).
Funded insurance trusts for insurance on the life of the grantor in Burnet v.
Wells, 289 U.S. 670, 53 S.Ct. 761 (1933).
Alimony trusts and trusts to discharge an obligation of the settlor held taxable
to the settlor in Dougfas v. Willcuts, 296 U.S. 1, 56 S.Ct. 59 (1935). (Changed
as to alimony trusts by the Revenue Act of 1942, § 200; now§ 171 of the I.R.C.)
The same result was reached in Helvering v. Schweitzer, 296 U.S. 551, 56 S.Ct.
304 (1935), on trusts for support of minor children.
Helvering v. Clifford, 309 U.S. 331, 60 S.Ct. 554 (1940), taxed the income
from a term trust to the settlor.
Helvering v. Stuart, 317 U.S. 154, 63 S.Ct. 140 (1942), taxed entire_income
of a trust for minor children to the settlor-father. But cf. § 134 of the Revenue Act
of 1943.
10
Burnet v. Wells, 289 U.S. 670 at 675, 53 S.Ct. 7-61 (1933).
11
The cases cited in notes 5, 6, 7, and 9, supra, are not intended to serve as a
list of authorities on the problems therein discussed. They are cited to delineate some
other aspects of the family income problem.
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clarity of the family is to make it possible for the taxpayer to surrender title to another and to keep dominion for himself, or, if
not technical dominion, at least the substance of enjoyment." 12
In essence, this retention of 'the substance of enjoyment' is the
motive for the creation of most present day family partnerships.
Family partnerships have as yet had Jittle attention from the
United States Supreme Court.18 This is probably due to the secondary
role which partnerships have had as a method of business organization.14 The corporate form of organization has the advantages of limiting liability to the amount of capital invested and continuing in operation after the death or personal insolvency of its owners.15 So, despite
the excess profits tax which has caused a great many closely held corporations to be liquidated and replaced by partnerships, it is unlikely
that the partnership will replace the corporation as the organizational
form for larger business enterprises. But for smaller businesses depending upon the abilities of a few men for their success, a partnership which will avoid the corporate income and excess profits taxes is
a desirable form of business organization.
Partnerships are dealt with in subtitle A, chapter I, subchapter C,
supplement F of the Internal Revenue Code. Section I 8 I 16 provides
that partnerships, as such, are not taxable, and that the partners are to
be taxed- only in their individual capacity. Section 187 requires the
filing of partnership information returns. The statute here presents a
basic dichotomy; we recognize the partnership entity for the purpose
of filing returns, and look through it to tax the partners.
The term "partnership" is defined in section 3797 (a) ( 2) of the
, Internal Revenue Code. It is not a very satisfactory definition. For,
though the code provides that other types of business organizations
are to be taxed as partnerships, it does not define, for income tax purposes, the essential elements of a partnership. One might expect to
12

Mr. Justice Cardozo in Burnet v. Wells, 289 U.S. 670 at 677, 53 S.Ct. 761
(1933).
,
18
Burnet v. Leininger, 285 U.S. 136, 52 S.Ct. 345 (1932), did involve a
situation similar to a family partnership. It was not an attempt at a true family partnership as the taxpayer did not attempt to make his wife a partner in the partnership
enterprise. The case is more fully discussed in section II of the text, infra.
14 Rabkin and Johnson, "The Partnership Under the Federal Tax Laws," 55
HARV. L. REV. 909 (1942).
15
Id. at 910.
16 This section is still substantially the same as c. 16, § III, D, of the Revenue
Act of 1913, 38 Stat. L. 168.

MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW

[ Vol. 44

rely upon the common law definitions as to what constitutes a partnership and who are partners,11 but the Regulations 18 are a warning
against any such reliance upon local law. So we may have a business
organization which is a valid partnership by state law, and is not
recognized as such for income fax purposes; 19 .and conversely, though
not recognized by local law it may be a valid partnership under the
Internal Revenue Code.20
·

II
TESTS TO DETERMINE THE INCIDENCE OF FEDERAL INCOME TAX
BEFORE 1930-V~LIDITY OF PARTNERSHIP UNDER STATE LAW

·A. Test of Validity of Common Law Partnership:
Meehan v. Valentine
When the problem of family partnerships first came before the
courts and the Board of Tax Appeals, state law and common law
property concepts were used to determine whether or not a partnership existed. The decisions which did not allow the wife and children
to share income were based on the theory that the wife or children
were not members of the partnership.21 If under the applicable state
law it was a valid partnership, it would be recognized for income tax
purposes. Using state law to determine the incidence of the federal
income tax led to different results in similar situations.22 Meehan v.
Valentine 23 is a general statement of the common law prerequisites of
17

.

6 MERTENS, LAw l!>F FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION, § 35.02, note 10. " •••
statute does not attempt, however, an all inclusive definition and accordingly it would
seem local law and common law would be factors to be considered in determining
whether organizations other than those set forth in the statute should be treated as
partnerships for purposes of taxation, and as to who are partners generally."
18
TREAS. REG. I I 1, § 29.3797-1 provides that the I.R.C. makes its own classification for purposes of taxation and that local law is of no importance in this connection. See also TREAS. REG. I 11, § 29.3797-4.
19
TREAS. REG. I I 1, § 29.3797-1. The entire income of the partnership may be
taxed to one of the partners, e.g., M.M.Argo, 3 T.C. 1120 (1944), or it may be
.. taxed as a corporation, TREAS. REG. I I I, §§ 29.3797-4, 5.
20
Pugh v. United States, (D.C. W. Va. 1931) 48 F. (2d) 600; J. W. Brackman, 24 B.T.A. 259 (1931); J.E. Biggs, Sr., 15 B.T.A. 1092 (1929); Albert
Kahn, 14 B.T.A. 125 (1928); Elmer Klise, IO B.T.A. 1234 (1928); Earle L.
Crossman, IO B.T.A. 248 (1928); L. F. Sunlin, 6 B.T.A. 1232 (1927); many
1 other cases could be cited to the same effect.
21 Randolph Paul, "The Background of the Revenue Act of 1937," 5 UNIV.
CHr. L. REv. 41 at 76 (1937).
22
Compare Hudson M. Knapp, 5 B.T.A. 762 (1926), with Harry P. Kelly, 9
B.T.A. 832 (19:27).
28
145 U.S. 611, 12 S.Ct. 972 (1892)~
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a valid partnership. It set up three requirements which are still considered essential: 24 ( r) that the parties join together to carry on a
trade for the common benefit, ( 2) each party contribute property or
services, and (3) the parties have a community of interest in th~ profits.

B. Contribution of Capital or Service to Partnership as
Test of Validity
25
In Nancy J. Ryman the decedent taxpayer went into the cattle
business with his sons, and the taxpayer and his sons each contributed
capital and services and shared profits. The board found a common
law partnership valid for income tax purposes.
When the taxpayer's wife was his partner, each contributing capital
and services, and the applicable state law allowed the wife to become
her husband's partner, the family partnership was also recognized~ 28
And when the father contributed property with the understanding
that the children were to work in the business and the profits were to
be divided,21 the Board of Tax Appeals found that a valid partnership existed. This result could hardly be challenged today, since the·
children actually managed the business.
If each partner contributes capital and services, ( or one partner
capital and the other services) the partnership should be recognized,
for it has met the requirements of Meehan v. Valentine, and a common
law partnership has been formed.
The fact that state law does not forbid family partnerships is not
reason enough to hold a partnership valid. This became more apparent
when family partnerships appeared in which the wife did not contribute services, and her contribution of capital was limited to what
had previously been received as a gift from her husband-partner.28
24

E.g., Felix Zukaitis, 3 T.C. 814 (1944); Frank J. Lorenz, 3 T.C. 746
(1944).
25
5 B.T.A. 1288 (1927).
26
H. J. Bartron, 3 B.T.A. 1262 (1926); Thomas F. Kelly, 9 B.T.A. 834
(1927); R. C. McKnight, 13 B.T.A. 885 (1928). Failure to file partnership information returns in the Bartron and McKnight cases, supra, was not thought to require
a different result.
27 Frank E. Eyestone, 12 B.T.A. 1232 (1928); H. T. Loper, 12 B.T.A. 164
(1928). Cf. John Peters, 16 B.T.A. 895 (1929).
28
Estate of John Barnes, Jr., 7 B.T.A. 924 (1927), affirmed sub nom., Commissioner v. Barnes, (C.C.A. 3d, H}29) 30 F. (2d) 289; W. A. Bellingrath, 3 B.T.A.
11 (1925); M.L. Virden, 6 B.T.A. 1123 (1927); John T. Newell, 17 B.T.A. 93
(1929).
Accord: Warren MacPherson, 19 B.T.A. 651 (1930), where the capital was a
gift of the wife's father-in-law.

MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW

[ Vol. 44

The partnerships were held valid on the grounds that state law permitted husband and wife partnerships and there was sufficient evidence
of an intent to form a partnership. This result was reached though the
parties did not comply with all the formalities of state law, 29 the other
partners not having been notified of the admission of a new partner,
and by the applicable state law the wife just got a right to the profits.80
In L. S. Cobb 31 the wife's capital contribution to the partnership
was a gift from her husband. The gift was conditional; a divorce would
terminate the wife's interest in the partnership. The Board of Tax
Appeals considered this condition subsequent void as "repugnant to the
interest created," and held that a valid partnership was formed under
California law.
The same result was reached though the wife's share of the profits
was a fixed sum, the business was carried on in the name of the husband, no one 1mew of the partnership, and no partnership returns were
filed. 32
In J.E. Biggs, Sr. 88 the West Virginia law did not permit a husband and wife partnership. The board held that such a partnership
agreement was enforceable in equity if fair to the wife. The partnership was unheld despite the failure-of the wife to contribute any capital.
Capital to start the coal business was obtained through a loan secured
by a note which the wife did not sign.
The results were much the same when children were the challenged members of the family partnership. When the taxpayer set up a
trust for a minor child and then entered into partnership with the
trust and the profits were paid to the trust,8., the partnership was recognized. Where the taxpayer assigned his interest in a partnership to his
seven children, the profits were held taxable to the children.85 In
neither of the cases did the children render services to the partnership,
29

John T. Newell, 17 B.T.A. 93 (1929). Cf. William W. Parshall, 7 B.T.A.
318 (1927), acquiescence, B.T.A. 6452, INT. REv. BuL. 24 (1928).
30
Estate of John Barnes, Jr., 7 B.T.A. 924 (1927), affirmed sub nom., Commissioner v. Barnes, (C.C.A. 3d, 1929) 30 F. (2d) 289.
31
9 B.T.A. 547 (1927). No services were performed by the wife. The result
is extremely doubtful even on local law since the wife had no right to her share of the
profits unless a majority of the other partners agreed to give them to her.
32
R. A. Bartley, 4 B.T.A. 874 (1926).
33
15 B.T.A. 1092 (1929).
34
M. A. Reeb, 8 B.T.A. 759 (1927).
85
John Peters, 16 B.T.A. 895 (1929). Cf. Harry P. Kelly, 9 B.T.A. 832
(1927).
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and their capital contributions were limited to amounts received as
gifts from their father.
In Millard D. Olds 86 the taxpayer wanted to make his three
daughters his partners. He decided to sell each of them a 2 5 percent
interest in his business, taking a $400,000 demand note, non-interest
bearing, as payment from each. The father was to continue to conduct
the business in his own name, and the daughters were not to withdraw
any of the profits except as he saw fit. Then the father obtained a
Michigan court decree calling the arrangement a valid partnership.
The daughters had the privilege of rescinding the transaction. The
Court for the Sixth Circuit called it a valid partnership, saying that
it was not material that the taxpayer could decide how much his daughters could withdraw: this was a collateral agreement within the power
of the partners. Nor did the court think it material that the taxpayer
would not collect on the notes.
"They [ the notes] were executed and were collectible in
his hands except upon a good faith showing of dissatisfaction. Besides, he had the right to give an interest in his business to his
daughters. There is no creditor attacking the transaction, and if
the gift was made in good faith, the taxing authorities can not
complain." 87
When there was no substantial evidence of more than an intent
of the parties to form a partnership, the Board of Tax Appeals had
no difficulty in holding that the arrangement was not a partnership
for tax purposes,88 although making no mention of the fact that any
income of the business was entirely from the personal services of the
husband. So when other personal service arrangements, in which the .
parties had gone through the form of creating a partnership organization, came before the board, they were held valid.39 The result is not
surprising, for throughout this period many of the board's decisions
seem to intimate that the recipient of income is the party to be ta..xed. 40
86

Millard D. Olds, 15 B.T.A. 560 (1929), affirmed, (C.C.A. 6th, 1932) 60 F.
(2d) 252.
87
60 F. (2d) 252 at 255 (1932).
88
W. A. Felton, 18 B.T.A. 63 (1929). Cf. Julius Goldenberg, 5 B.T.A. 213
( I 926), where even an intent to form a partnership seems doubtful.
89
Elihu Clement Wilson, II B.T.A. 963 (1928), non-acquiescence, B.T.A.
8500, 8 INT. REV. BuL. 62 (1929); C. W. Crane, i9 B.T.A. 577 (1930).
40
A. T. Wagner,17 B.T.A. 1030 (1929); R. E. Wing, 17 B.T.A. 1028
(1929); Commissioner v. Barnes, (C.C.A. 3d, 1929) 30 F. (2d) 289.
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C. .Transfer of Present Interest in Firm Assets as
Requirement for Validity
Where the parents attempted to enter into a partnership agreement with their son to give him a share of the profits without giving
a present interest in the firm assets, this was held to be the equivalent
of an assignment of income and taxable to the parents since the son
contributed neither capital nor services.41 There was, however, a
dissent which stated that a partnership is a contractural relationship,
contributions of capital or services are not necessary, and that if the
parties agree to be partners, outsiders cannot challenge the agreement. 42

D. Effect of Invalidity of Husband and Wife Partnerships
Under State Law
The Board of Tax Appeals found it difficult to apply its local law
characterization consistently. Partnerships which were otherwise valid
because of a contribution by both husband and wife of capital and
services came before the board from states which did not allow a wife
to be her husband's partner.
In L. F. Sunlin 48 it was held that the purpose of the Michigan
statute forbidding husband and wife partnerships was to enlarge the
rights of the wife, not to deprive her of her property, and that the
wife did not lose her interest in the business because of her marriage.
Cf. W. A. Bellingrath, 3 B.T.A. II (1925); R. A. Bartley, 4 B.T.A. 874
(1926).
41
John W. Graham, 8 B.T.A. 1081 (1927); Samuel J. Lidov, 16 B.T.A. 1421
(1929).
Cf. Meyers v. Allen, (C.C.A. 8th, 1929) 34 F. (2d) 883; Charles F. Colbert,
Jr., 12 B.T.A. 565 (1928).
42
Harry P. Kelly, 9 B.T.A. 832 (1927).
Cf. John Peters, 16 B.T.A. 895 (1929), where crediting of profits was held
to give an interest in 0e business.
43
6 B.T.A. 1232 (1927).
Cf. Earle L. Crossman, IO B.T.A. 248 (1928); Elmer Klise, 10 B.T.A. 1234
{1928), where wife contributed capital only; Albert Kahn, 14' B.T.A. 125 (1928),
where wife contributed capital and neither husband nor wife contributed services;
Pugh v. United States, (D.C. W. Va. 1931) 48 F. (2d) 600; and Arthur Stryker,
17 B.T.A. 1033 (1929), where wife contributed services and property acquired by
gift; J. W. Brackman, 24 B.T.A. 259 (1931), wife contributing services. All the
above cases held wife taxable on her share.
But see Hamilton v. Commissioner, (C.C.A. 1st, 1928) 24 F. (2d) 668, where
wife contributed capital and husband the services and held, no partnership because
Massachusetts law does not allow husband and wife to be partners.
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This holding was based upon the policy of the local law, rather than
upon its letter; but it was a significant step in the direction of developing independent characterization for the revenue laws and imposing
a uniform tax burden upon similar business arrangements in whatever
·
state made.
In this period before 1930, the general technique of analysis of the
validity of the family partnership seems to have been that if the parties to the challenged partnership were satsified, the tax collector could
not complain.44 The courts and the Board of Tax Appeals lost sight
of the fact that Meehan v. Valentine, required the parties to associate,
or join together, to carry on a trade for the common benefit. In this
period it mattered not that the partnership was a personal service
partnership/5 or that the challenged member of the partnership contributed no capital.46 So long as the parties went through the formal
ritual of creating a partnership, it was generally held valid.

III
v. LEININGER
A situation similar to a family partnership is presented when the
taxpayer is conducting a _partnership business with a third party and
gives to his wife or children a share of his interest. The taxpayer makes
no attempt to give a present interest in the firm assets. Burnet v. Leininger 41 is the leading case on this sub-partnership variation of the
family income problem.
In Burnet v. Leininger the taxpayer and his wife agree to share the
profit and loss from the. taxpayer's interest in a partnership. The other
partner did not consent to the wife becoming a partner in the firm; the
wife did not contribute capital or services. The profits were paid to
the taxpayer who in turn paid them to his wife. The Court held that
THE SUB-PARTNERSHIP: BURNET

H Commissioner v. Olds, 15 B.T.A. 560 (1929), affirmed, (C.C.A. 6th, 1932)
60 F. (2d) 252; B. M. Phelps, 13 B.T.A. 1248 (1928).
See John W. Graham, 8 B.T.A. 1081 at 1085 (1927) (dissenting opinion).
Perhaps the highpoint of this view was reached in E. L. Kier, I 5 B.T.A. l I 14
(1929). Love, member of the Board of Tax. Appeals, thought so highly of the arrangement there under review that he could not restrain himself from penning an
ode to the petitioners. He said, 15 B.T.A. at II 18, "This was a family business.
There existed between the brothers a harmony and affection that is refreshing to
note and in the marital communities an admirable spirit of cooperation . • . • We
believe no reasonable element of suspicion can be drawn from the informalities •.•• "
45
See note 39, supra.
46
See note 33, supra.
47
285 U.S. 136, 52 S.Ct. 345 (1932).

188

MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW

the husband was taxable on the profits, since the wife's interest was
purely derivative, and an agreement to share profits and loss is not
enoug)i to constitute the wife a member of the partnership.
As long as there was no gift of a present interest in the firm assets,
the Board of ':fax Appeals and the circuit courts had no difficulty in
reaching the same results,4 8 and the Leininger decision affirmed their
handling of the problem.
There is little essential difference between a sub-partnership and
an assignment of income. There are three important events in the taxation of income: earning, receipt, and enjoyment.49 In Lucas c. Earl 60
the revenue acts were construed to tax income to him who earned it,
despite any anticipatory arrangement designed to prevent its vestihg
in the earner. The assignor remains in control of the income, for it is
only throµgh his continued efforts that the income could be earned.51
Control of the disposition of income by the earner is a substantial
equivalent of its receipt and enjoyment, and makes it taxable to the
earner. 62
At common law a partnership is not considered a juristic entity,58
and the revenue acts have taxed the individual partners and ignored
the firm. 54 If we look through the partnership entity to the partner
who is liable for the tax, Burnet v. Leininger is a necessary corollary
of Lucas v. Earl. Since no attempt is made to give a present interest
in the firm assets, the property and services of the assignor-partner
produce the income, and any assignment of earnings, conditional upon
his continued efforts, is subject to his control.
48

George M. Cohan, II B.T.A. 743 (1928), affirmed, (C.C.A. 2d, 1930) 39 F.
(2d) 540; Sam H. Harris, 11 B.T.A. 871 (1928), affirmed, (C.C.A. 2d, 1930) 39
f'. (2d) 546; Luce v. Burnet, (C.C.A.D.C. 1932) 55 F. (2d) 751, affirming, 18
B.T.A. 923 (1930); J. Fred Staebler, 17 B.T.A. 1086 (1929); W. L. Heinickle,
20 B.T.A. 155 (1930); Houston Brothers, 22 B.T.A. 51 (1931); E.W. Battleson,
22 B.T.A. 455 (1931).
Cf. T. V. Larsen, 14 B.T.A. 160 (1928), affirmed, (C.C.A.D.C. 1930) 50 F.
(2d) 308.
' But see C.R. Thomas, 8 B.T.A. 118 (1927), where the profits were taxed to
the recipient who had purchased a share of her father's interest with her own money.
The Board of Tax Appeals found a trust in favor of the daughter, and held, amount
distributed to the daughter could be deducted from gross income of the trust.
49
Van Meter v. Commissioner, (C.C.A. 8th, 1932) 61 F. (2d) 817.
60
281 U.S. I I I , 50 S.Ct. 241 (1930).
51
Rossmoore v. Commissioner, (C.C.A. 2d, 1935) 76 F. (2d) 520.
62
Corliss v. Bowers, 281 U.S. 376, 50 S.Ct. 336 (1930).
63
Rossmoore v. Commissioner, (C.C.A. 2d, 1935) 76 F. (2d) 520.
64
I.R.C., § 181.
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IV
EFFECT OF THE DOCTRINE OF LUCAS

v.

EARL ON

FAMILY PARTNERSHIPS

The decision in Lucas v. Earl, did not have as great an effect on
the lower federal courts and the Board of Tax Appeals as its language
might suggest. The requirement that "import and reasonable construction" of the taxing statutes, rather than "attenuated subleties," were to
control was not too closely followed during the years immediately after
the decision.
Local laws were still, in some cases, the basis of decisions favorable
to the taxpayer. 55 Receipt of profits was held prima facie evidence of
partnership by local law, and the fact that no interest in the firm assets
was granted to the challenged partners was held not to upset the prima
facie case. 56 Nor did use by the wife of partnership profits to pay household expenses, which had formerly been paid by the taxpayer, seem to
invalidate the arrangement.57
The cases reiterated that a husband had the right to give his wife
or children a share of his business if he saw fit to do so,58 and if a gift
were made, the family partnership was valid for tax purposes.59 The
gift was held valid though the taxpayer remained the owner of the
interest on the books of the partnership, and the profits were paid to
him rather than to his donees; and he continued to make capital contributions to the partnership, retained management of the partnership,
and retained his responsibility to the other partners.00
Nor did the taxpayer's reservation of sole authority to run the
business seem to invalidate the gift. 61 Even taking all the profits ( with
the consent of the taxpayer's two minor children) and giving a note
as security ( two years later) was not thought to be so incompatible
55

D. M. Rose, Administrator, 22 B.T.A. 1334 (1931), reversed sub nom., Rose
v. Commissioner, (C.C.A. 6th, 1933) 65 F. (2d) 616; W. H. Simmons, 22 B.T.A.
1ro6 (1931); N. H. Hazlewood, 29 B.T.A. 595 (1933).
56
W. H. Simmons, 22 B.T.A. uo6 (1931).
57
Rose v. Commissioner, (C.C.A. 6th, 1933) 65 F. (2d) 616; Glenn M. Harrington, 21 B.T.A. 260 (1930).
58
Rose v. Commissioner, (C.C.A. ,6th, 1933) 65 F. (2d) 616.
59
Lula Kell, 32 B.T.A. 21 (1935), reversed sub nom., Kell v. Commissioner,
(C.C.A. 5th, 1937) 88 F. (2d) 453; Pugh v. United States, (D.C.W.Va. 1931) 48
F. (2d) 600; Walter W. Moyer, 35 B.T.A. u55 (1937); N. H. Hazlewood, 29
B.T.A. 595 (1933); Richard H. Oakley, 24 B.T.A. ro82 (1931); Albert G.
Dickinson, 23 B.T.A. 1212 (1931).
6
° Kell v. Commissioner, (C.C.A. 5th, 1937) 88 F. (2d) 453.
61
Richard H. Oakley, 24 B.T.A. ro82 (1931).
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with an irrevocable gift as to make the partnership profits taxable to
the donor. The Board of Tax Appeals refused to question the bona
fides of the transaction. 62 A motive of tax avoidance in making the gift
did not in itself make·tµe partnership invalid for tax purposes.63
An oral agreement to form a partnership was held just as effective
as a written one, 64 and the fact that the business was conducted in the
name of only one of the partners was not thought to be conclusive
evidence against the formation of a valid partnership.65
However, the eight years following Lucas v. Earl were marked
by some significant changes in the handling of family partnerships.
The theory that a personal service partnership would not be recognized
when the alleged partner contributed no services was effectively established during this period. Local law was toppled. from its position of
pre-eminence in characterization of the tax laws, artd the judges began
to realize that family arrangements which resulted in substantial tax
benefits ought to be closely scrutini~ed. _
1

A. Evidence Required to Establish Partnership
Rather than accepting the taxpayer's mere self-serving statements,
the Board of Tax Appeals and the courts began to require credible
evidence of conduct demonstrating the alleged partner's actual participation in the business and an assumption of responsibilities to those
- with whom the business is transacted.66
Merely permitting wife and children to draw checks on the part.:.
nership account,67 was not considered credible evidence of the establishment of a partnership; nor was the reservation of the right to deprive
the alleged partner of any share of the profits· thought compatible with
a valid family partnership.68
62

N. H. Hazlewood, 29 B.T.A. 595 (1933).
Cf. Kell v. Commissioner, (C.C.A. 5th, 1937) 88 F. (2d) 453.
68
Walter W. Moyer, 35 B.T.A. 1155 (1937).
64
Cha:qiplin v. Commissioner, (C.C.A. 10th, 1934) 71 F. (2d) 23; Charles
Tifft, 25 B.T.A. 986 (1932); J. Kammerdiner, 25 B.T.A. 495 (1932); Albert G.
Dickinson, 23 B.T.A. 1212 (1931); Leonard M. Gunderson, 23 B.T.A. 45 (1931).
But see Glenn M. Harrington, 21 B.T.A. 260 (1930); J. Howard Coombs,
20 B.T.A. 1021 (1930), and its sequel, Elizabeth M. Coombs, 25 B.T.A. 1320
(1932).
65 Champlin v. Commissioner, (C.C.A. 10th, 1934) 71 F. (2d) 23; Walter
'w. Moyer, 35 B.T.A. 1155 (1937); J. Kammerdiner, 25 B.T.A. 495 (1932);
Leonard M. Gunderson, 23 B.T.A. 45 (1931).
66
Estate ot E. A. Wickham, 22 B.T.A. 1393 (1931), affirmed sub nom., Wickham v. Commissioner, (C.C.A. 8th, 1933) 65 _F. (2d) 527; W. M. Buchanan, 20
B.T.A. 210 (1930).
67 Covington v. Commissioner, (C.C.A. 5th, 1939) 103 F. (2d) 201.
68
T. L. Tally, 22 B.T.A. 712 (1931).
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Nor was an agreement to share profit and loss held to have the
same effect in a tax case as in a suit to establish ·a partnership over the·
opposition of one of the members. The suit against a partner would
establish liability as well as the right to share profits. In a suit by the
government the only effect of such an agreement is to give an additional tax advantage.69
When the taxpayer introduced his wife or children as partners to
his business associates, credit agencies, banks, or creditors this holding
out was considered credible evidence of a partnership,7° especially if
the wife or children had separate property which would add to the
credit of the firm. 71
·
This requirement of credible evidence of a partnership to support
self-serving statements was a drastic departure from the view that if
the parties to the agreement were satisfied, the government had no
standing to complain.72

B. Waning Influence of Local Law
During the decade following Lucas v. Earl the local law became
less important in determining who are partners and in setting up the
requirements for a valid partnership. Local partnership law is designed to safeguard the rights of partner against partner, and the
rights of creditors against the partnership. The United States, in imposing an income tax, occupies neither the position of partner nor of
creditor so there is no reason why the local property characterization
should be binding on either the .government or the taxpayer.
In tax cases the tests established by local law impose no liabilities; 78 they merely give the parties a tax advantage. 74 When this became apparent, the courts began to hold that when Congress has
shown how a tax is to be imposed, they were not going to let state
law make a difference. 75 Even when state law was invoked, it was to
determine the validity of a transfer of property rights, not to deter69
Covington v. Commissioner, (C.C.A. 5th, 1939) 103 F. (2d) 201; James L.
Robertson, 20 B.T.A. II2 (1930); W. M. Buchanan, 20 B.T.A. 210 (1930); Harry
C. Fisher, 29 B.T.A. 1041 (1934).
70
Pugh v. United States, (D.C.W.Va. 1931) 48 F. (2d) 600; Leonard M.
Gunderson, 23 B.T.A. 45 (1931); Albert G. Dickinson, 23 B.T.A. 1212 (1931);
J. Kammerdiner, 25 B.T.A. 495 (1932).
71
Pugh v. United States, (D.C.W.Va. 1931) 48 F. (2d) 600.
72
See note 44, supra.
78
James L. Robertson, 20 B.T.A. 112 (1930).
HWilliam M. Buchanan, 20 B.T.A. 210 (1930).
75
Glenn M. Harrington, 21 B.T.A. 260 (HJ30); Elizabeth M. Coombs, 25
B.T.A. 1320 (1932).
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mine the litigants' status as partners. 76 Local law was no longer important in determining who were partners under section r 8 r of the
Internal Revenue Code. 11

C. Personal Service Partnership
During this period the problem of the personal service family
partnership was presented to the courts. The personal service partnership is one in which capital is not a material income producing factor.
The earnings of the firm are dependent upon the talents and abilities
of the partners, and not upon the amount of capital invested in the
enterprise. In effect, the true capital asset of the firm is the personal
ability of the partners. If we look through the partnership entity to
the individual partner, all the earnings of the partnership are income
from the personal services of the firm members; and any attempt to
divide those earnings with a partner who does not contribute services
is essentially an assignment of income and should not be recognized
for income tax purposes.
The courts did not analzye the problem in these terms. No distinction was made between a partnership conducting a business in which
capital was a material income producing factor, and a partnership in
which services were of paramount importance. So·we find a personal
service partnership being declared invalid because the taxpayer did not
relinquish control of the profits, and remained essentially the owner
of them. 78 In other cases. the analysis was in terms of close scrutiny of
conduct being required in any family arrangement and the conduct
belying a partnership. 79 At other times we get hints that the personal
service aspects of the partnership under review is the basis for the
decision when it is stated that the challenged partners did not have
,such relation to the business as to be considered partners. 80 But nowhere is there a clear statement of the theory underlying the decisions.
In the absence of a clear delineation of the theory involved, it is
not surprising to find a personal service partnership recognized when
all the formal requirements of. ·a partnership were met, although
neither capital nor services were contributed by the alleged partners. 81
Cf. Rose v. Commissioner, (C.C.A. 6th, 1933) 65 F. (2d) 616.
Atwood v. United States, (D.C. Mich. 1932) 3 F. Supp. 321; Charles Tifft,
25 B.T.A. 986 (1932).
78 Kasch v. Commissioner, (C.C.A. 5th, 1933) 63 F. (2d) 466, certiorari denied,
290 U.S. 644, 54 S.Ct. 62 (1933).
79 Harry C. Fisher, 29 B.T.A. 1041 (1934); Thomas M. McIntyre, 37 B.T.A.
812 (1938).
80
James L. Robertson, 20 B.T.A. II2 at II4 (1930).
81 Clara B. Parker, Executrix, 30 B.T.A. 1231 (1934); Jasper Sipes, 31 B.T.A.
709 (1934).
76
77
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A variation of the personal service partnership is found when capital is necessary to the successful conduct of the business, although personal services are the vital elements. In such a situation, when the
wives of the taxpayers contributed the necessary capital, the family
partnership was recognized for tax purposes.82

V
v. CLIFFORD
A. The Doctrine of H elvering v. Clifford
The decision in H elvering v. Clifford 88 marks a new era in federal
taxation. The Commissioner of Internal Revenue and the Department
of Justice had sought to persuade the courts to disregard artificial arrangements designed to evade taxes and to decide cases upon the
economic realities underlying the transaction. 84 The Clifford decision
was the culmination of these efforts. 85 Retention of control over property or enjoyment of indirect or insubstantial benefits which "blend
so imperceptibly with the normal concepts of full ownership" 86 was
now enough to determine the incidence of the tax.
Commissioner v. Tenney 81 is an example of the type of artificial
partnership arrangements which were disposed of by the courts with
little ceremony. There the wife contributed capital to be used by her
husband in trading on the stock market. The capital was to remain the
property of the wife; the husband was to give advice and the profits
and losses were to be shared equally. The wife retained control over
the sale and purchase of the shares, and the shares and brokerage
account were listed in her name. Any profits resulted from the sale
of property owned by the wife, and she was held taxable on the income.
FEDERAL TAXATION SINCE HELVERING

B. Personal Service Family Partnerships
The personal service family partnership has come before the
courts in many aspects since I 940. Constant exposure to this tax avoid82 Humphreys v. Commissioner, (C.C.A. 2d, 1937) 88 F. (2d) 430; Charles
Tifft, 25 B.T.A. 986 (1932).
88
309 U.S. 331, 60 S.Ct. 554 (1940).
84
REP. Arn. GEN. 66 (1937).
85
This decision was foreshadowed by other cases which looked through the
formal arrangements to the economic reality. Cf. Griffiths v. Commissioner, 308 U.S.
355, 60 S.Ct. 277 (1939); Higgins v. Smith, 308 U.S. 473, 60 S.Ct. 355 (1940);
Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465, 55 S.Ct. 266 (1935); Robert S. Eaton, 37
B.T.A. 283 (1938), affirmed on opinion below, (C.C.A. 2d, 1939) IOO F. (2d)
1013, certiorari denied, 307 U.S. 636, 59 S.Ct. 1032 (1939).
86
309 U.S. 331 at 336, 60 S.Ct. 554 (1940).
81
(C.C.A. 1st, 1941) 120 F. (2d) 421. Cf. Robert S. Eaton, 37 B.T.A. 283
(1938).
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ance device has given the courts the opportunity to devel~p a logically
consistent method of dealing with them.
There are many possible variations of the personal service family
partnership. Probably the least subtle arrangement has the taxpayer
and another member of his family agreeing to pool their earnings. The
earnings are to go , to a partnership and then to be divided equally
between the partners. 88 The taxpayer may contribute a large amount
of capital to the alleged partnership to give it an air of legitimacy. 89
It is difficult to call such an arrangement a partnership; it is an assignment of income and taxable to the earner of that income.1' 0
When the taxpayer was a lawyer and attempted to form a partnership with members of his family, the partnership was not recognized. 91
For although a lawyer may form a partnership, any such agreement
with his wife and child, neither of whom contributed services, is an
assignment of earnings ineffective to shift the tax burden.
I. Requirement of Contribution of Services
Earp v. Jones 92 is the leading case on personal service partnerships. The taxpayer gave his wife an undivided one-half interest in
his insurance business and went into partnership with her. Partnership
books were set up and. new contracts of agency were executed with the
.
msurance companies.
The wife took no part in the conduct of the business. Household
expenses formerly paid by the taxpayer were now charged to the
wife's share of 'partnership ·earnings. The taxpayer went so far as to
borrow the balance of her share of the profits and use them for his
own purposes. It was found that the purpose of this arrangement was
to minimize taxes, not to create a new enterprise. The Court for the
Tenth Circuit held that when the taxpayer changes his method• of
doing business to minimize taxes, the changes must be real and substantial. The taxpayer here was still in complete control, still doing
business in the same way without any of the real restrictions which
usually flow from a partnership relation, and all the firm profits were
taxable to him. 93

.

88
Villere v. Commissioner, (C.C.A.. 5th, 1943) 133 F. (2d) 905; Joseph L.
Sweigard, P-H (1944) MEMO. DEc. 1[44,3,51, 443 C.C.H. STANDARD FED, TAX
SERV. 1f7813(M).
.
,
89
Joseph L. Sweigard, P-H (1944) MEMO. DEc. 1[44,351, 443 C.C.H. STANDARD FED. TAX SERV, 1f7813(M).
90
See note 88, supra.
91 Tinko.ff v. Commissioner, (C.C.A. 7th, 1941) 120 F. {2d) 564.
92
(C.C.A. 10th, 1942) 131 F. (2d) 292, certiorari denied, 318 U.S. 764,63
S.Ct. 665 (1943). See also Mead v. Commissioner, (C.C.A. 5th, 1942) 131 F. {2d)
323, similar facts and (,Xistence of family partnership again denied.
98
Compare Peter B. Loftus, P-H (1944) MEMO, DEc. 1[44,307, 443 C.C.H.
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It does not matter what the business of the taxpayer might be, so
long as the earnings of that business are derived from the personal
efforts of the individual, and not from any capital which may be employed in the firm. The taxpayer may be a salesman selling g9ods
on commission,94 the owner of an insurance agency, 95 or a repairer and
rebuilder of machinery; 96 the principles involved are still the same.
Although· it may be an aid to the court in arriving at its decision, it is
immaterial that the taxpayer had previously paid household expenses
from his own earnings which are now being paid from the partnership
earnings and charged against the distributive share of the wife. 97
Similarly, the disposition of profits is not material. That the wife did
not withdraw her share of the profits,98 or that the husband appropriated them to his own use 99 might be important in determining whether
.there was a partnership under the applicable state law in order to hold
the wife liable to the firm's creditors, but it would be of no importance
m determining tax liability.100
The salient fact remains that the taxpayer retains active manageSTANDARD FED. TAX SERV. 1f7737(M) and E. R. Ledbetter, P-H (1942) MEMO.
DEc. 1f42,039, 423 C.C.H. STANDARD FED. TAX SERv. 1f7401-G with Earp v. Jones,
(C.C.A. 10th, 1942) 131 F. (2d) 292, certiorari denied.
In both Loftus and Ledbetter the partnership was recognized. The Tax Court
found that capital was a material income producing factor and that the wife in each
case contributed capital.
94
Waldburger v. Helvering, (C.C.A. 2d, 1942) 131 F. (2d) 598; Francis Doll,
2 T.C. 276 (1943), affirmed, (C.C.A. 8th, 1945) 149 F. (2d) 239; J. G. Fredeking,
P-H (1943) MEMO. DEc. 1f43,464, 433 C.C.H. STANDARD FED. TAX SERv.
f.7754(M); G. Eliott Krusen, P-H (1944) MEMO. DEC. 1f44,287, 443 c.c.H.
STANDARD FED. TAX SERV. 1f7714(M).
95
Mead v. Commissioner, (C.C.A. 5th~ 1942) 131 F. (2d) 323; Earp v. Jones,
(C.C.A. 10th, 1942) 131 F. (2d) 292, certiorari denied, 318 U.S. 764 (1943); Edward J. Miller, P-H (1944) MEMo. DEc.1f44,083, 443 C.C.H. STANDARD FED. TAX
SERV. 1f7414(M).
96
Schroder v. Commissioner, (C.C.A. 5th, 1943) 134 F. (2d) 346; M. M. Argo,
3 T.C. II20 (1940).
97
Cf. Mead v. Commissioner, (C.C.A. 5th, 1942) 131 F. (2d) 323; Earp v.
Jones, (C.C.A. 10th, 1942) 131 F. (2d) 292, certiorari denied, 318 U.S. 764
(1943); Waldburger v. Helvering, (C.C.A. 2d, 1942) 131 F. (2d) 598; M. M.
Argo, 3 T.C., II20 (1944); Edward J. Miller, P-H (1944) MEMO. DEc. 1f44,083,
443 C.C.H. STANDARD FED. TAX SERV. 1f 7414(M); Leo J. Feistel, P-H (1945)
MEMO. DEC. 1f45,035, 454 C.C.H. STANDARD FED. TAX SERV. 1f7269(M).
But cf. E. R. Ledbetter, P-H (1942) MEMO. DEC. 1f42,039, 423 C.C.H.
STANDARD FED. TAX SERV. 1f7401-G, which recognized the partnership.
98
Waldburger v. Helvering, (C.C.A. 2d, 1942) 131 F. (2d) 598.
99
Mead v. Commissioner, (C.C.A. 5th, 1942) 131 F. (2d) 323; Earp v. Jones,
(C.C.A. 10th, 1942) 131 F. (2d) 292; Schroder v. Commissioner, (C.C.A. 5th,
1943) 134 F. (2d) 346; Francis Doll, 2 T.C. 276 (1943), affirmed, (C.C.A. 8th,
1945) 149 F. (2d) 239; J. G. Fredeking, P-H (1943) MEMO. DEc. 1f43,464,
433 C.C.H. STANDARD FED. TAX SERV. 1f7754(M).
100
Schroder v. Commissioner, (C.C.A. 5th, 1943) 134 F. (2d) 346.
1
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ment,101 the· wife has no voice in the conduct of the business,102 and
business is done in exactly the same way as it was prior to the partnership.103 The wife receives her portion by virtue of the marital relationship, and not as a partner.104
When the motive for changes in the metliod of doing business is
to avoid taxes, it is not too much to require that any changes be substantial.105 But in these personal service family partnerships, whatever
is earned is a result of the personal efforts of the taxpayer.106 There can
be no material changes in the way of doing business, so the partnership serves no business function. 107 When everything of value to the
business is contributed by one individual, all of the profits are actually
earned by that individual and are taxed to him.108
2.

What Constitutes "Service''

If these partnerships are to be recognized at all, they should be
recognized only if the challenged partner contributes services; for
the profits are then the result of the joint efforts of the partners.109
The question then arises, what are to be considered services? 110 If the
101 Mead v. Commissioner, (C.C.A. 5th, 1942) 131 F. (2d) 323; Francis Doll,
2 T.C. 276 (1943), affirmed, (C.C.A. 8th, 1945) 149 F. (2d) 239; Frank J. Lar. kins, P-H (1945) MEMO. DEC. 1f45,029, 454 C.C.H. STANDARD FED. TAX SERV.
1f7258(M).
102 Francis Doll, 2 T.C. 276 (1943), affirmed, (C.C.A. 8th, 1945) 149 F. (2d)
239; Schroder v. Commissioner, (C.C.A. 5th, 1943) 134 F. (2d) 346.
103
Mead v. Commissioner, (C.C.A. 5th, 1942) 131 F. (2d) 323; Earp v.
Jones, (C.C.A. 10th, 1942) 131 F. (2d) 292; Schroder v. Commissioner, (C.C.A.
5th, 1943) 134 F. (2d) 346; Waldburger v. Helvering, (C.C.A. 2d, 1942) 131 F.
(2d) 598; Francis Doll, 2 T.C. 276 (1943), affirmed, (C.C.A. 8th, 1945) 149 F.
(2d) 239; M. M. Argo, 3 T.C. u20 (1944); J. G. Fredeking, P-H (1943) MEMO.
DEc.1f43,464, 433 C.C.H. STANDARD FED. TAX SERV. 1f7754(M); Frank J. Larkins,
P-H (1945) MEMO. DEC. 1f45,029, 454 C.C.H .. STANDARD FED. TAX SERV.
1f7258(M).
104 Mead v. Commissioner, (C.C.A. 5th, 1942) 131 F. (2d) 323; A. Penziner
v. United States, (D.C.Cal. 1944) 54 F. Supp. 842.
105 Earp v. Jones, (C.C.A. rnth,'1942) 131 F. (2d) 292; Waldburger v. Helvering, (C.C.A. 2d, 1942) 131 F. (2d) 598.
106 M. M. Argo, 3 T.C. Il20 (1944); G. Elliott Krusen, P-H (1944) MEMO.
DEc. 1f44,287, 443 C.C.H. STANDARD FED. TAX SERV. 1f7714(M), affirmed, (C.C.A.
3d, 1945) 148 F. (2d) 210.
107 Waldburger v. Helvering, (C.C.A. 2d, 1942) 131 F. (2d) 598; J. G.
Fredeking, P-H (1943) MEMO. DEc. 1f43,464, 433 C.C.H. STANDARD FED. TAX
SERV. 1f 7754(M).
108 Mead v. Commissioner, (C.C.A. 5th, 1942) 131 F. (2d) 323.
109 Max German, 2 T.C. 474 (1943); Joseph A. Nash, P-H (1942) MEMO.
DEC. 1f42,241, 423 C.C.H. STANDARD FED. TAX SERV. 1f7516-B.
110 To whom are the services to be rendered? See M. W. Turner, Sr., P-H
(1944) MEMO. DEC. 1f44,394, 443 C.C.H. STANDARD FED. TAX SERV. 1f7857(M),
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services rendered are of the same kind or as essential to the business
as those of the taxpayer, no real problem exists. But if the wife works
in the office, doing a job which is worth $30.00 per week on the labor
market, is she to be considered as having contributed services enough
so that she may share equally the profits of a partnership which may
earn twenty times that amount each week? This has been considered
enough to support a family partnership in which services are the
material income producing factor. 111 Services in an "advisory" capacity112 or helping to design the firm's advertising 118 have also been considered enough, though the firm's income was not derived from the
type of service rendered by the alleged partner.
a. Validity of Partnership
But the problem is seldom so simple as that presented in the purely
personal service partnership. Often, both capital and services are
material income producing factors. Are the partnerships then to be
called valid because of the earnings which can be attributed to the
invested capital; or are the arrangements to be held invalid because
of the personal service elements? 114
It has been stated that if most of the income of the partnership
is due to personal services of the taxpayer, the family partnership _
will not be recognized; but that if most of the income is due to invested capital there can be a valid partnership.115 When the alleged
partner contributed no services, and the partnership is recognized because most of the income resulted from invested capital, this is recognizing a partial assignment of income. For to the extent that the earnings came from the personal services of the taxpayer, he is assigning
his right to receive the income and being relieved of the attendant tax
where partnership held valid though services were rendered to an entirely different
business enterprise than the one before the Court.
Cf. George A. Croft, P-H (1944) MEMO. DEc.1f44,330, 443 C.C.H. STANDARD
FED. TAX SERV. 1f7777(M).
111
Felix Zukaitis, 3 T.C. 814 (1944); Clinton Davidson, 43 B.T.A. 576
(1941); Peter F. Loftus, P-H (1944) MEMO. DEc.1f44,307, 443 C.C.H. STANDARD
FED. TAX SERV. 1f7737(M).
112 Peter F. Loftus, P-H (1944) MEMO. DEc. 1f44,307, 443 C.C.H. STANDARD
FED. TAX SERV. 1f7737(M).
113
E. R. Ledbetter, P-H (1942) MEMO. DEc. 1f42,039, 423 C.C.H. STANDARD
FED. TAX SERV. 1f7401-G.
114
Before a partnership can be held valid because capital is a material income
producing factor, the court must assume that there can be a valid family partnership
when the wife or children contribute no services and the only capital contributed was
received as a gift from the taxpayer. This is discussed in the text, infra.
115
M. M. Argo, 3 T.C. 1120 (1944). But six of the judges did not agree with
the reasoning of the case, though concurring in result.
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burden. Partial assignments of income through the medium of a partnership have thus been recognized,116 while other partial assignments
are held invalid under Lucas v. Earl.
b. Incidence of the Tax

But if a partnership was ·in fact formed, it should not be held
invalid because a large part of its earnings resulted from the personal
services of the taxpayer. For, to the extent that the earnings resulted
from the invested capital of the challenged partner, the taxpayer is
taxed on income he did not earn, receive or enjoy.
It seems that so long as a substantial part of the earnings are from
capital, the partnership may be recognized.117 The courts then tend
to disregard the personal service aspects of the partnership and analyze
it as if capital alone produced the earnings.118 Other factors may then
lead the court to hold that a valid partnership was not formed. If the
business is conducted in the same way as before the partnership and
the alleged partner has no control over the profits earned,119 or if the
arrangements have no real business function,120 the partnership may
not be recognized. If the partnership has a business function, it may
be recognized for tax purposes, though the challenged partner is not
active in the business.121
c. Suggested Solution

A practical solution to the problem would be to apportion the income of the partnership. The Tax Court could determine how much
116
J. D. Johnston, Jr., 3 T.C. 799 (1944); Nathan, Grossman, Klein and
Rosenberg, P-H (1943) MEMO. DEc. 1f43,232, 433 C.C.H. STANDARD FED. TAX
SERV. 1f7392(M).
1 7
~ J. D. Johnston, Jr., 3 T.C. 799 (1944). Cf. E. R. Ledbetter, P-H (1·942)
MEMO. DEc. 1f42,039, 423 C.C.H. STANDARD FED. TAX SERV. 1f7401-G; Peter F.
Loftus, P-H (1944) MEMO. DEc. 1f44,307, 443 C.C.H. STANDARD FED. TAX SERV.
1f7737(M); Clinton Davidson, 43 B.T.A. 576 (1941). In each of these cases there
was also a finding that services were rendered by the alleged partner.
118 Montgomery v. Thomas, (C.C.A. 5th, 1944) 146 F. (2d) 76; R. C. Bennett, P-H (1941) MEMO. DEc. 1f41,408, 414 C.C.H. STANDARD FED. TAX SERV.
1f7656-C; Joe Lynch, P-H (1941) MEMO. DEc. 1f41,227, 414 C.C.H. STANDARD
FED. TAX SERV. 1f7379-E.
.
119 Charles F. Goodwin, P-H (1944) MEMO. DEc. 1f44,321, 443 C.C.H.
STANDARD FED. TAX SERv. 1f779o(M); H. G. Whittenberg, Sr., P-H (1944) MEMO.
DEc. 1f44,293, 443 C.C.H. STANDARD FED. TAX SERV. 1f7725(M).
120
R. W. Camfield, P-H (1944) MEMO. DEc. 1f44,039, 443 C.C.H. STANDARD
FED. TAX SERV. 1f7335(M).
121 Nathan, Grossman, Klein and Rosenberg, P-H (1943) MEMO. DEc. 1f43,232,
433 C.C.H. STANDARD FED. TAX SEl!,V, 1f7392(M).
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of the firm's earnings were due to the invested capital and how much
were due to the services of the taxpayer. This could be done by determining the amount of invested capital in the taxpayer's business; the
balance of the earnings would be attributed to the services of the taxpayer. Then, to the extent that the wife invested capital in the firm,
she could share in the earnings which resulted from capital in the
same proportion as her investment bore to the total amount of capital
employed. But she would not share in the earnings attributable to the
services of her husband. If the wife contributed services, she could
receive her just share of the earnings which those services produced.122
The Tax Court is well able to handle this method of computation.
Mathematical exactness in determination is not necessary; a reasonable approximation is all that is required and that the Tax Court can
make after hearing the evidence presented. It is no more difficult here
than when the reasonable salary of a corporate officer is in issue.
In Max German 128 the Tax Court has already taken some steps
in this direction. There the taxpayer and wife made a joint loan to
go into business. Both worked in the business and built it up to a successful enterprise. Then the wife took a smaller part in its operation.
The court held that since the wife was not active in the business now;
though it had originally been a joint enterprise, the wife could share
in the profits to the extent of only 25 per cent.
Of course the 2 5 per cent is just an approximation, but it is a reasonable one. It would not be just to tax all the profits to the husband
because originally the wife was as responsible for the firm's growth and
prosperity as the husband. To allow the wife to report one-half of
the firm earnings would have given that family an unwarranted fax
benefit. The solution adopted is fair to all parties; its use should be
extended to cover the problem outlined above.
In William ]. Hirsch m the government urged the Tax Court to
adopt this view, contending that section 182 (c) 125 permitted such a
result.
122
•
When the Tax Court determined the amount of the partnership income
which was due to the invested capital or to services, this would be a finding of fact.
How much weight must an appellate court give to these findings of fact? Under the
rule expounded in Dobson \r. Commissioner, 320 U.S. 489, 64 S.Ct. 239 (1943),
it would seem that the Tax Co,urt's determination would be final and not subject to
review.
,
128
2 'f.C. 474 (1943). The decision is based on§ 3797 (a) (2) of the Internal
Revenue Code rather than on § l 8 l.
124
P-H (1945) MEMO. DEc.1f45,002, 454 C.C.H. STANDARD FED. TAX SERv.
1f7209. Husband and wife each contributed capital and services.
125
§ 182: "In computing the net income of each partner, he shall include,
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The Tax Court rejected the commissioner's argument, distinguishing the German case by stating that the commissioner had there denied
the existence of a partnership and here conceded it. The Tax Court
held that in the absence. of agreement to the contrary, partnership
profits are to be shared equally; there is a presumption that each
partner devotes all his time to the business and the court will not
attempt to evaluate the services of each partner.
Twenty-five years ago there was much to be said for the court's
view. At present, the fact that parties say they have formed a partnership is not binding on the tax authorities; if the partnership is held
valid, the decision of the parties as to respective shares of the profits
neecl not be binding either.
'
The Tax Court is now determining the basis of corporate shares,
reasonable compensation for corporate officers,126 and what amount
of a taxpayer's earnings is due to invested capital, so that the balance
might be reported as community property.121 To do the same in the
case of a family partnership would not be setting a dangerous precedent.

C. Analysis Where Capital Is Material Income Producing Factor
Family partnerships, when capital is the material income producing
factor, present to a court problems of analysis quite similar to those
involved in personal service partnerships. In the latter situation the
court must prevent an assignment of income from personal services; in
the former the court must distinguish between an assignment of income
from property and a transfer of the property itself with the rights to
any earnings from that property. An assignment of income from property is ineffective to shift tax liability,128 while a valid transfer of the
property itself makes the transferee the new owner and taxable on the
earnings. 129
whether or not distribution is made to him • • • •
"( c) His distributive shar~ of the ordinary net income or the ordinary net
loss of the partnership, computed as provided in section 183 (b)."
126
P-H (1945) MEMO. DEc.1f1f45,003, 45,018, 45,049 and 45,084,454 C.C.H.
STANDARD FED. TAX SERv. 1f1f721o{M), 7229(M), 7273(M), 7339{M)-a few of
the cases in the same volume following the Hirsch case in which reasonable compensation determined.
Cf. P-H (1945) MEMO. DEc. 1f45,on, 454 C.C.H. STANDARD FED. TAx SERv.
1f7224{M). The court undertook to allocate between business and private expense,
the fees paid by a taxpayer to his lawyer.
127
Lawrence Oliver, 4 T.C. 684 (1945).
128
Helvering v. Horst, 311 U.S. II2, 61 S.Ct. 144 (1940).
129
James 0. Peterson, P-H (1943) MEMO. DEc. 1f43,491, 443 C.C.H. STAND-
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To form a valid partnership there must be an agreement to form
a partnership; 180 it must be presently effective, and not just purport
to create a partnership in the future. 181 Then, if there is a contribution
of services by the alleged partner, a partnership will probably be recognized.182 In the absence of services by the alleged partner, a contribution
of capital will be an acceptable substitute.m When the capital comes
from the separate estate of the challenged partner, additional resources
have been added to the enterprise and a real partnership is formed.
But when the capital contribution comes from the taxpayer himself,
either through a gift or a fictitious sale, it is difficult to see what the
partner has contributed.134
This in itself is not reason enough to deny to the taxpayer the right
to form a partnership with his family in this way.185 For, if the taxpayer
were conducting the same business through the medium of a corporation, he could give shares of stock to his wife or to his children. If
the gift were unconditional, it would be effective to vest in the donee
the right to receive any dividends on these shares; having received
the dividends, the donee would be liable for the tax.186
Essentially, there is little difference between the two situations.
A simple substitution of a partnership for a corporation should not
lead to radically different tax burdens. In order to impose different
ARD FED. TAX SERV. 1f7134(M); Montgomery v. Thomas, (C.C.A. 5th, 1944) 146
F. (2d) 76.
Cf. Robert P. Scherer, 3 T.C. 776 (1944).
180 Estate of Joe S. Ellis, P-H (1941) MEMO. DEc. 1f41,482, 413 C.C.H.
STANDARD FED. TAX SERV. 1f7748-D.
Cf. George A. Croft, P-H (1944) MEMO. DEc.1f44,330, 443 C.C.H. STANDARD
FED. TAX SERV. 1f7777(M), as to how little evidence is needed to find the necessary
intent.
·
181 Joseph Supornick, P-H (1943) MEMO. DEc.1f43,481, 433 C.C.H. STANDARD
FED. TAX SERV. 1f7787(M).
182 Benjamin Shander, P-H (1943) MEMO. DEC. 1f43,123, 443 C.C.H. STANDARD FED. TAX SERV. 1f7266(M); Sidney M. Harvey, P-H (1942) MEMO. DEc.
1f42,554, 423 C.C.H. 1f7863-A; George A. Croft, P-H (1944) MEMO. DEc.
1f44,330, 443 C.C.H. STANDARD FED. TAX SERV. 1f7777(M); M. W. Turner, Sr.,
P-H (1944) MEMo. DEc. 1f44,394, 443 C.C.H. STANDARD FED. TAx SERV.
1f7857(M) (contribution of services by the daughter-in-law).
188 Montgomery v. Thomas, (C.C.A. 5th, 1944) 146 F. (2d) 76.
184
Blalock v. Allen, (D.C. Ga. 1944) 56 F. Supp. 266; R. W. Camfield, P-H
(1944) MEMO. DEC. 1f44,039, 443 C.C.H. STANDARD FED. TAX SERV. 1f7335(M).
See J. D. Johnston, 3 T.C. 799 (1944), dissenting opinion.
185 Hardymon v. Glenn, (D.C. Ky. 1944) 56 F. Supp. 269; M.W. Smith, Jr.,
3 T.C. 894 (1944); R. C. Bennett, P-H (1941) MEMO. DEc. 1f41,408, 413 C.C.H.
STANDARD FED. TAx SERV. 1f7656-C; Joe Lynch, P-H (1941) MEMO. DEc. 1f41,227,
413 C.C.H. STANDARD FED. TAX SERV. 1f7379-E; Irene McCullough, P-H (1944)
MEMO. DEC. 1f44,236, 443 C.C.H. STANDARD FED. TAX SERV. 1f7648(M).
186 Bardach v. Commissioner, (C.C.A. 6th, 1937) 90 F. (2d) 323.
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tax burdens, there should be substantial differences· in methods of
doing business. The interposition of a corporate entity does not seem
to be so substantial a difference as to require a different result. This
is especially true today; courts have disregarded the corporate entity
when they thought it necessary to do so to reach a desirable result.187
The tax statute itself, in imposing the tax, disregards the partnership
entity,188 while the partnership entity is recognized when the partnership makes a sale of property contributed by a partner.139 The policy of
the tax statute, rather than strict adherence to legal theory seems to
be determinative.140 It is submitted that the statute. does not require,
nor does logic compel, a difference in tax burdens in two situations
outlined above. If a man may make a valid gift of shares of a corporation to his wife or children, he ought to be allowed to make a gift of
the assets of a partnership.141

r. The Split in. the Tax Court
The question whether a taxpayer ought to be allowed to make a
gift to members of his immediate family of tlie financial assets of
his ·business and form a partnership with them has caused wide
differences of opinion among the members of the Tax Court. Some
of .the judges feel that since the present statute does not forbid family
partnerships of this sort, if the formal requirements of a partnership
have been met, the partnership ought to be allowed.142 They realize
that to recognize family partnerships is to allow a large measure of
tax avoidance, but do not feel that the doctrine of the Clifford case
. ought to be extended so far as to condemn this situation.148
187
Griffiths v. Commissioner, 308 U.S. 355, 60 S.Ct. 277 (1939); Gregory v.
Helvering, 293 U.S. 465, 55 S.Ct. 266 (1935).
138
Internal Revenue Code, § 181.
189
Helvering v. Walbridge, (C.C.A. 2d, 1934) 70 F. (2d) 683.
140
Higgins v. Smith, 308 U.S. 473 at 477, 60 S.Ct. 355 (1940). "The Government may look at actualities and upon determination that the form employed for doing
business or carrying out the challenged tax event is unreal or a. sham may sustain or disregard the e.ffect of the fiction as best serves the purposes of the statute."
141
Montgomery v. Thomas, (C.C.A. 5th, 1944) 146 F. (2d) 76, and Robert
P. Scherer, 3 T.C. 776 ( l 944), are authorities holding that if a valid gift of property
was made, the partnership will be recognized for tax purposes.
142
Robert P. Scherer, 3 T.C. 776 (1944); M.W. Smith, Jr., 3 T.C. 894
(1944); J. D. Johnston, Jr., 3 T.C. 799 (1944).
Cf. Justin Potter, 47 B.T.A. 607 (1942); R. C. Bennett, P-H (1941) MEMO.
DEc., 1[41,408, 413 C.C.H .. STANDARD FED. TAX SERV. 1[7656-C;· Irene McCullough, P-H (1944) MEMO. DEc. 1[44,236, 443 C.C.H. STANDARD FED. TAX SERV.
1[7648 (M).
148
Robert P. Scherer, 3 T.C. 776 (1944).
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Another and more radical group within the Tax Court think that
the Clifford doctrine can be extended to cover these facts without doing
violence to the views of the Supreme Court.144 They do not deny that
if the taxpayer makes a valid gift, he can form a partnership with
members of his family. But they do make it so difficult to prove relinquishment of all control over the intended gift that unless other
factors having independent probative effect are also present, the gift
will be held invalid.145 In 0. William Lowry 146 the taxpayers had
been conducting, through the medium of a corporation, a furniture
manufacturing business. One and one-half years before the dissolution
of the corporation and the formation of the challenged partnership,
one of the taxpayers made a gift of shares to his wife. This was held
to be in anticipation of the creation of the partnership and not a valid
gift.
The views of the conservative wing of the Tax Court can be seen
in J. D. Johnston, Jr. 141 There the taxpayer had been in partnership
with his father, manufacturing peanut butter. In contemplation of a
new partnership, he sold half his interest to his wife. The wife gave
an unsecured note to pay for her interest. This note was to be paid
out of the future earnings of the business. It does not appear that the
wife had substantial separate property so that the note would have
any real value. A valid partnership was found on these facts; the
court held that the wife contributed capital.148
In M. W. Smith, Jr. 149 the taxpayer made a gift of a one-half
interest in his lumber company to his wife. A valid partnership was
found, although the wife contributed no services and the business was
conducted in the name of the husband. The court distinguished the
144
Francis E. Tower, 3 T.C. 396 (1944), reversed, (C.C.A. 6th, 1945) 148
F. (zd) 388; 0. William Lowry, 3 T.C. 730 (1944); Frank J. Lorenz, 3 T.C. 746
(1944), affirmed, (C.C.A. 6th, 1945) 148 F. (zd) 527.
Cf. A. L. Lusthaus, 3 T.C. 540 (1944), affirmed, (C.C.A. 3d, 1945)-F.
(zd)-.
145
0. William Lowry, 3 T.C. 730 (1944).
148
3 T.C. 730 (1944).
Cf. Francis E. Tower, 3 T.C. 396 (1944), reversed, (C.C.A. 6th, 1945) 148 F.
(zd) 388; Frank J. Lorenz, 3 T.C. 746 (1944), affirmed, (C.C.A. 6th,-1945) 148
F. (zd) 527.
141
3 T.C. 799 (1944).
148
A fictitious sale is no different from a gift. In neither case is capital added
to the firm: the firm does not have greater credit than it had previously, the credit of
the firm is still based on the credit rating of the taxpayer.
Cf. Blalock v. Allen, (D.C. Ga. 1944) 56 F. Supp. z66.
149
3 T.C. 894 (1944).
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LoW:y decision by saying that, there, no valid gift was made. This is
obviously the weakest kind of reasoning. The question whether a valid·
gift was made is a mixed question of law and fact. The fact is the attempted transfer of rights in property; whether the transfer will be
raised to the status of a gift depends on the applicable law. To distinguish the facts of one case from those of another by a conclusion
of law is not in any way explaining the differences, if any, involved.150

The Scherer Decision
The more radical wing of the Tax Court which has sought to extend the doctrine of Helvering v. Clifford has met with an important
setback in the Robert P. Scherer case.151 The taxpayer there set
2.

150

There is no logical reason for considering a finding that a valid gift was
made as purely a finding of fact. If the Tax Court determines that shares of a closely
held corporation are worth X dollars per share, that type of finding ought not to be
disturbed. The appellate court may feel that the result is not exactly right, but efficient administration of the revenue laws can not be achieved if this were to be redetermined in each reviewing court; there is no "right answer" and a reasonable
approximation is all that is necessary.
In the family partnership situation, a question of policy is involved; are we
going to permit a tax avoidance scheme to succeed? The appellate courts must be
permitted to guide policy; the result ought not to be determined by the fortuitous
assignment of a sympathetic judge to try the case.
The present policy of the Supreme Court is to give weight to findings of fact
made by an administrative board. Gray v. Powell, 314 U.S. 402, 62 S.Ct. 326
(1941); Dobson v. Commission, 320 U.S. 489, 64 S.Ct. 239 (1943). If the findings
are reasonably rooted in the evidence, the Court feels that appellate review of the
facts found is not desirable.
However well this system may work in other administrative situations, even where'
the Tax Court itself is involved, such a rule, if the finding of a valid gift is to be
called a finding of fact, does not seem desirable here. There are fourteen judges on the
Tax Court; they do not agree on what facts are necessary to constitute a valid partnership. See text, supra. The decision in the case may depend on which of the fourteen
tries the case. If a finding that no valid gift was made is to be considered a finding
of fact and not subject to review, there can be no guides to developing a uniform
technique for dealing with these cases. This is especially true in a family partnership
situation since the taxpayer usually takes great pains to see that -the formal requirements of a partnership have been met and it is therefore nearly impossible to say that
there is no substantial evidence to ~upport the decision.
The weaknesses of the view expounded in the Dobson case, supra, are further
emphasized by the fact that the taxpayer retains the option of taking his case before
the Tax Court, or (after paying the assessed deficiency) suing for a refund in the
Federal District Court. Cases are subject to review of facts found. This could easily
result in having two constrasting methods of handling a family partnership in vogue
in the Tax Court, and other techniques in use in each of the ten circuits and the
District of Columbia.
151 3 T.C. 776 (1944), acquiescence, T.C. 109825, INT. REv. BuL. 1944-17-,
11837.
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up four trusts for each of his minor children with his wife as trustee.
To each trust he gave a share of the assets of his business, and then
entered into a partnership with the trusts and his wife. The taxpayer
retained exclusive power to determine what amount of the firm profits
would be distributed. He could force a dissolution of the partnership,
and upon dissolution would get a larger share of the firm assets than
he had received of the firm profits. The gifts were held valid and the
partnership recognized; the commissioner acquiesced in the decision.
The acquiescence may be based on the fact that the Commissioner
of Internal Revenue had assessed a gift tax, thus to some extent conceding the validity of the gift.152 Opper, Judge of the Tax Court, did
not think that this assessment was binding on the commissioner, for
the taxpayer did not force him to elect which of the two inconsistent
positions he would maintain.153 Unwilling to impose different tax burdens in similar cases, Opper has reluctantly followed the Scherer
case.154
3. Trusts as Partners
If the partnership which is being challenged involves a trust,
what rules are to be followed in determining whether such a partnership is to be recognized? There have been a great many decisions determining the status of trusts under sections 166 and 167 of
the Internal Revenue Code. If the trust income is not taxable to the
settlor under these sections, will the addition of the family partnership
factor result in taxing trust income to the settlor? 155 The fact that the
partner is a trust instead of an individual should not in itself make
the trust's distributive share of the income taxable to the settlor. But
under the Clifford case, retention of control over the trust corpus will
make the income taxable to the settlor under. section 22 (a) of the
Internal Revenue Code. The partnership then becomes important in
determining whether the settlor has retained such control.
In the Scherer case, trusts for minor children were recognized as
members of the partnership. The trustee, wife of the settlor, had no
152

Cf. Estate of Fred E. Barringer, P-H (1942) MEMO. DEC. 1[42,504, 423
C.C.H. STANDARD FED. TAX SERV. 1[7830-C.
158
Philip M. McKenna, P-H (1944) MEMO. DEc. 1[44,312, 443 C.C.H.
STANDARD FED. TAX SERV. 1f7758(M).
154
Ibid.
155
In most of these cases the taxpayer is the settlor of the trust as well as the
manager of the partnership business. Losh v. Commissioner, 1 T.C. 1019 (1943),
affirmed, (C.C.A. 10th, 1944) 145 F. (2d) 456; Armstrong v. Commissioner, (C.C.A.
10th, 1944) 143 F. (2d) 700; Robert P. Scherer, 3 T.C. 776 (1944); Rose Mary
Hash, 4 T.C. 878 (1945).
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business experience, and the taxpayer managed the trust estates as well
as .the partnership business.166 The Tax Court found that control over
the trust property was exercised by the taxpayer as manager of the
partnership not as settlor or trustee, and that the Clifford rationale did
not, therefore, apply.157
When the settlor was trustee as well as manager of the business,
retaining unlimited discretion as to investments, and the corpus would
revert to the settlor if the beneficiaries died before the termination of
the trust, the income was taxed to the ·settlors.158 The retention of the
right to extend the duration of the trust,159 restraints on alienation
after termination of the trust,160 or ,the reservation of the right to
remove any beneficiary 161 were additional factors resulting in the appli~
cation of the Clifford doctrine.
Without considering the Clifford doctrine, the trust may not be
recognized as a partner. For when no profits were in fact paid to the
trust,162 or if the amount of the trust's capital interest in the partnership had not been ~xed or paid,168 it is difficult to hold that the trust
is a valid member of the partnership.

· D. Some General Observations
When hearing family partnership cases, courts appear to have difficulty in formulating legal standards. Each case seems to stand on
its own particular facts.164 It is often difficult to determine what is the
exact issue before the court. Sometimes it is a question as to whether
a valid gift was made with the do nee getting dominion and control; 165
156
A large part of the finµ profits was due to the personal services of the taxpayer.
The trustee had discretionary powers regarding distribution of trust income to
the beneficiaries. These powers were exercised by the taxpayer.,
157
Accord, Armstrong v. Commissioner, (C.C.A. 10th, 1944) 143 F. (2d) 700.
Cf. Justin Potter, 47 B.T.A. 607 (1942), acquiescence, T.C. 97018 (1943)
INT. REv. BuL. I 8, where the powers exercised were held by operation of law.
158
Rose Mary Hash, 4 T.C. 878 (1945); Losh v. Commissioner, I T.C. 1019
(1943), affirmed, (C.C.A. 10th, 1944) 145 F. (2d) 456.
159
Losh v. Commissioner, I T.C. 1019 (1943), affirmed, (C.C.A. 10th, 1944)
145 F. (2d) 456.
160
Ibid.
161
Rose Mary Hash, 4 T.C. 878 (1945).
162
Ibid.; Tyson v. Commissioner, (C.C.A. 8th, 1944) 146 F. (2d) 50.
168
Tyson v. Commissioner, (C.C.A. 8th, 1944) 146 F. (2d) 50.
164
E. R. Ledbetter, P-H (1942) MEMO. DEc. 1[42,039, 423 C.C.H. STANDARD
FED. TAX SERV. 1[7401-G. See J. D. Johnston, 3 T.C. 799 (1944), dissent. ,
165
0. William Lowry, 3 T.C. 730 (1944).
Cf. M. W. Smith, Jr., 3 T.C. 894 (1944), where the issue seemed to be
whether a completed gift was made.
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or, the issue may be the good faith of the gift,160 or even whether
there was a "bona fide intent to create and maintain a partnership." 167
Different judges will draw widely contradictory inferences from the
same or similar facts.168 The purpose in forming the partnership may
have been to avoid taxes. That in itself is not generally considered
enough of a reason for invalidating a partnership,169 and they have
been recognized despite that motive. However, the Tax Court, on
substantially similar facts, has held a partnership invalid.110 On other
facts, a legitimate business purpose may outweigh the tax avoidance
motive.171 The business of the taxp,ayer may have been conducted in
the same manner after the partnership was formed as it had been previously. In cases in which the trial judge considered that a factor in
his decision, contradictory results were reached.112
If the people doing business with the partnership do not know
that it is a partnership, that is generally evidence that no partnership
was formed; 178 but it has not prevented family partnerships from
being recognized.174 Nor did conducting the business in the name of
the husband defeat the partnership.175 Even the fact that no present
interest in the firm assets was given to the alleged partner has not in
all cases made the partne~ship invalid for tax purposes.17cs When the
166
Sidney M. Harvey, P-H (1944) MEMO. DEc. 1f44,309, 443 C.C.H. STANDARD FED. TAX SERV. 1f7754(M).
167
Hardyman v. Glenn, (D.C. Ky. 1944) 56 F. Supp. 269.
168
Compare M. W. Smith, Jr., 3 T.C. 894 (1944), and J. D. Johnston, Jr.,
3 T.C. 799 (1944), with 0. William Lowry, 3 T.C. 730 (1944), and Francis E.
Tower, 3 T.C. 396 (1944), reversed, (C.C.A. 6th, 1945) 148 F. (2d) 388.
168
Hardyman v. Glenn, (D.C. Ky. 1944) 56 F. Supp. 269; M. W. Turner,
Sr., P-H (1944) MEMO. DEc, 1f44,394, 443 C.C.H. STANDARD FED. TAX SERv.
1f7857(M).
17
°Francis E. Tower, 3 T.C. 396 (1944), O. William Lowry, 3 T.C. 730
( 1 944).
171
Benjamin Shandler, P-H (1943) MEMO. DEc. 1f43,123, 433 C.C.H. STANDARD FED. TAX SERV. 1f7266(M); M. W. Turner, Sr., P-H (1944) MEMO. DEc.
1f44,394, 443 C.C.H. STANDARD FED. TAX SERV. 1f7857(M).
172
A. L. Lusthaus, 3 T.C. 540 (1944), affirmed, (C.C.A. 3d, 1945)-F.'
(2d)-; Joseph W. Grant, P-H (1944) MEMo. DEc. 1f44,254, 443 C.C.H. STANDARD FED, TAX SERV. 1f7674(M) (both held not valid); J. D. Johnston, Jr., 3 T.C.
799 (1944) (valid).
173
Joseph W. Grant, P-H (1944) MEMO. DEc. 1f44,254, 443 C.C.H. STANDARD
FED, TAX SERV. 1f7674(M). Stanley Bradshaw, P-H (1944) MEMO, DEc. 1f44,249,
443 C.C.H. STANDARD FED. TAX SERV, 1f7673(M).
174
M. W. Smith, Jr., 3 T.C. 894 (1944); Sidney M. Harvey, P-H (1942)
MEMO. DEc, 1f42,554, 423 C.C.H. STANDARD FED. TAX SERv. 1f7863-A.
m M. W. Smith, Jr., 3 T.C. 894 (1944).
176
Benjamin Shander, P-H (1943) MEMo. DEc. 1f43,123, 433 C.C.H. STANDARD FED. TAX SERV. 1f7266(M).
But see Joseph Supornick, P-H (1943) MEMO. DEc. 1f43,481, 433 C.C.H.
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taxpayer retains control of the operation and management of the business, some judges have considered that strong evidence that no real
partnership was forced; 111 others have felt that such retention of control
was not at all unusual and did not invalidate the partnership.178
Perhaps the decision, when all the formal requirements of a valid
partnership have been fulfilled, will be determined by the attitude of
the taxpayer toward the partnership.179 Did he treat it as a partnership,
or did all his actions deny its existence? 180 If the profits were not distributed in proportion to the record ownership; 181 if the wife's share
was used to pay the husband's obligations,182 or returned to the business; 188 if the taxpayer withdrew all the profits himself,184 or if the
taxpayer signed business contracts as the sole proprietor; 185 it is difficult to hold that a real partnership was formed. But if the taxpayer
STANDARD FED. TAX SERv. 1f7787(M); Robert Walker Tyson, P-H (1944) MEMO.
DEc. 1f44,060, 443 C.C.H. STANDARD FED. TAX SERV. 1f7384(M), which held family partnerships invalid on these grounds.
177
0. Wm. Lowry, 3 T.C. 730 (1944); Frank J. Lorenz, 3 T.C. 746 (1944),
affirmed, (C.C.A. 6th, 1945) 148 F. (2d) 527; Joseph W. Grant, P-H (1944)
MEMO. DEc. 1f44,254, 443 C.C.H. STANDARD FED. TAX SERV. 1f7674(M); Stanley
Bradshaw, P-H (1944) MEMO. DEC. 1f44,249, 443 c.c.~. STANDARD FED. TAX
SERV. 1f7673(M). Cf. Robert Walker Tyson, P-H (1944) MEMO. DEc. 1f44,060,
443 C.C.H. STANDARD FED. TAX SERV. 1f7384(M).
178
Hardyman v. Glenn, (D.C. Ky. 1944) 56 F. Supp. 269; Francis E. Tower,
(C.C.A. 6th, 1945) 148 F. (2d) 388.
Cf. Robert P. Scherer, 3 T.C. 776 (1944); Joe Lynch, P-H (1941) MEMO.
DEc. 1f41,227, 413 C.C.H. STANDARD FED. TAX SERv. 1f7379-E; Benjamin Shander,
P-H (1943) MEMO. DEC. 1f43,122, 433 C.C.H. STANDARD FED. TAX SERV.
1f7266(M).
179
Compare Earp v. Jones, (C.C.A. 10th, 1942) 131 F. (2d) 292, certiorari
denied, 318 U.S. 764, 63 S.Ct. 665 (1943); and Mead v. Commissioner, (C.C.A.
5th, 1942) 131 F. (2d) 323, where the partnerships were not recognized, with E. R.
Ledbetter, P-H (1942) MEMO. DEc. 1f42,039, 423 C.C.H. STANDARD FED. TAX
SERV. 1f7401-G; arid Peter F. Loftus, P-H (1944) MEMO. DEc. 1f44,307, 443
C.C.H. STANDARD FED. TAX SERV. 1f7737(M), which recognized the partnership.
180 Benjamin Shander, P-H (1943) MEMO. DEc. 1f43,123, 433 C.C.H. STANDARD FED. TAX SERV. 1f7266(M).
181 W. P. Sewell, P-H (1944) MEMO. DEc. 1f44,040, 443 C.C.H. STANDARD
FED. TAX SERV. 1f7332(M).
182
Robert Walker Tyson, P-H (1944) MEMO. DEc. 1f44,060, 443 C.C.H.
STANDARD FED. TAX SERV. 1f7384(M). But see Francis E. T-ower, 3 T.C. 396
(1944), reversed, (C.C.A. 6th, 1945) 148 F. (2d) 388.
183
Joseph W. Grant, P-H (1944) MEMO. DEc.1f44,254, 443 C.C.H. STANDARD
FED. TAX SERV. 1f7674(M).
184
Frank J. Lorenz, 3 T.C. 746 (1944), affirmed, (C.C.A. 6th, 1945) 148 F.
(2d) 527.
Cf. Blalock v. Allen, (D.C. Ga. 1944) 56 F. Supp. 266.
185
Stanley Bradshaw, P-H (1944) MEMO. DEc.1f44,249, 443 C.C.H. STANDARD
FED. TAX SERV. 1f 7673 (M).
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obtained additional credit for the partnership because of the wife's
participation,186 or if the profits were used by the wife to pay for her
separate property,187 a partnership may be found on otherwise similar
facts.
On the present state of the authorities, there. appear to be few
principles which will be generally applicable in the decision of family
partnership cases. It does seem, at least in partnerships in which capital
is a material income producing factor, that if a valid gift was made,
the partnership will be recognized.188
State law is no longer important in the decision of family partnership cases,189 and a state adjudication is not binding on the commissioner. When a state adjudication is held to be material, it is because
the Revenue Acts have left the determination of status to the local
law.100

VI
CONCLUSION

Congress can solve many of the difficulties which the courts have
encountered in dealing with family partnerships. It could provide for
returns which taxed income to the family unit, and not to the individual earner of income. This solution 'Yould be comparable to cutting
the Gordian kriot; it is a solution of doubtful wisdom. Many more
women are now gainfully employed than ever before, and many
women will go into business with their husbands after the war. They
;ill be business women, and take an active part in the business. To
forbid family partnerships will discriminate against the genuine family
business arrangements.
An alternative solution would be to permit family partnerships
186
James 0. Peterson, P-H (1943) MEMO. DEc. 1[43,491, 443 C.C.H. STANDARD FED. TAX SERV. 1f 7134(M).
187
R. C. Bennett, P-H (1941) MEMO. DEc. 1[41,408, 413 C.C.H. STANDARD
FED. TAX SERV. 1[7656-C.
188
Hardymon v. Glenn, (D.C. Ky. 1944) 56 F. Supp. 269; Montgomery v.
Thomas, (C.C.A. 5th, 1944) 146 F. (2d) 76; Tower v. Commissioner, (C.C.A. 6th,
1945) 148 F. (2d) 388.
Cf. Robert P. Scherer, 3 T.C. 776 (1944); Whayne v. Glenn, (D.C. Ky. 1945)
59 F. Supp. 517.
189
Stanley Bradshaw, P-H (1944) MEMO. DEc. 1[44,249, 443 C.C.H. STANDARD FED. TAX SERV. 1f7673(M); Frank J. Lorenz, 3 T.C. 746 (1944), affirmed,
(C.C.A. 6th, 1945) 148 F. (2d) 527; A. L. Lusthaus, 3 T.C. 540 (1944), affirmed,
(C.C.A. 6th, 1945)-F. (2d)-; M. M. Argo, 3 T.C. II20 (1944).
Cf. E. C. Ellery, 4 T.C. 407 (1944).
180 Doll v. Commissioner, 2 T.C. 276 (1943), affirmed, (C.C.A. 8th, 1945)
149 F. (2d) 239.
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only when the alleged partner takes an active part in the business. If
the wife is active in the business and a real partner, the family partnership should be recognized. This would eliminate all the phony family
arrangements which are giving the courts so much trouble.
_ When Congress, in 1937, was seeking to block up the loopholes
in the tax laws and prevent tax avoidance, the family partnership was
considered an unimportant avoidance device and Congress neglected
to take action on the problem.191 Since that time it has had greater
popularity. It is time for Congress to reconsider the problem and take
steps to combat its spread.
Under the present taxing statute, personal service partnerships are
not recognized and should not be recognized unless the alleged partner
contributes services. If the partnership derives income from capital
and personal services, the partnership should be recognized only to the
extent of the contribution by the alleged partner; if the partner contriputes capital, he should be per~itted to share in the income produced by capital. He ought to receive only such portion of that income
as his contribution bore to the total amount of capital invested. The
same method of computation should be used if the partner contributed
services.
If capital is the ~aterial income producing factor, and the alleged partner participates in the conduct of the business, the partnership should be recognized. If the only participation is a contribution
of capital, the partnership should be recognized if the capital came
'from the partner's separate property and added to the funds available
to conduct the business. If the only contribution to the firm had previously been received as a gift from the taxpayer, the partnership
should be recognized if taxpayer has parted with all control over that
property and the parties otherwise conduct thems.elves as if a valid
partnership had been created. The decision in H elvering v. Clifford
should not be extended to cover this situation. It ,is the job of Congress, not of the courts, to plug the loopholes in the Internal Revenue
Code.
191

H. Doc. 337, 75th Cong.; 1st sess. (1937) 7·

